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FEDERAL JURY FINDS TYSON FRESH MEATS,

INC. IN VIOLATION OF PACKERS AND

STOCKYARDS ACT

— by Roger A. McEowen* and Neil E. Harl** 
On February 17, 2004, a federal jury in Montgomery, Alabama, returned a $1.28 
billion verdict against Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc. (Tyson)1 in a class action lawsuit alleging 
that Tyson (formerly Iowa Beef Processors (IBP)) manipulated the price for fed cattle 
through the use of long-term contracts (known as captive supply cattle) in violation of the 
Packers and Stockyards Act.2 If the jury verdict stands and the case is upheld on appeal, 
the jury’s verdict will have significant implications for the future structure of the 
livestock industry. 
Background of the case 
The Pickett3 case was filed in the federal district court for the Middle District of 
Alabama in July of 1996 alleging anti-competitive practices by IBP, at the time the 
world’s largest beef packer. In late 2001, the case was certified as a nationwide class 
action lawsuit on the issue of whether IBP’s use of “captive supply” cattle (cattle 
acquired other than on the open, cash market) violates Section 202 of the PSA.4 
Packers and Stockyards Act (PSA) 
The PSA,5 enacted in 1921, is very broad in scope and regulates both packers and 
stockyards.6 The PSA would not likely have been adopted by the Congress if livestock 
marketing and the distribution of meat products did not present problems which were not 
sufficiently addressed by the existing antitrust laws of general application.7 Enforcement 
of the PSA is either by a civil action,8 initiated by the person aggrieved by the alleged 
violation of the PSA, or by an action taken by the Secretary of Agriculture upon request 
of the Attorney General.9 Jurisdiction is in the federal district court.10 
The PSA provides, in pertinent part, that: 
“It shall be unlawful for any packer with respect to livestock, meats, meat food 
products, or livestock products in unmanufactured form, or for any live poultry 
dealer with respect to live poultry, to: 
(a) Engage in or use any unfair, unjustly discriminatory, or deceptive practice 
or device; or… 
(d) Sell or otherwise transfer to or for any other person, or buy or otherwise 
receive from or for any other person, any article for the purpose of with 
the effect of manipulating or controlling prices, or of creating a monopoly 
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in the acquisition of , buying, selling, or dealing 
in, any article, or of restraining commerce; or 
(e) 	Engage in any course of business or do any act 
for the purpose or with the effect of 
manipulating or controlling prices, or of creating 
a monopoly in the acquisition of, buying, 
selling, or dealing in, any article, or of 
restraining commerce….”11 
In Pickett, 12 the plaintiffs claimed that Tyson’s store of 
livestock (via captive supply) allows Tyson to avoid 
reliance on auction-price purchases in the open market for 
most of their supply. Tyson then uses that leverage, the 
claim is, to depress the market prices for independent 
producers on the cash and forward markets in violation of 
the PSA.13 
The Jury’s Findings 
The jury unanimously found that (1) there was a single 
national market for cattle; (2) Tyson’s use of captive supply 
had an anticompetitive effect on the cash market for fed 
cattle; (3) Tyson had no legitimate business reason or 
competitive justification for using captive supply; (4) 
Tyson’s use of captive supply proximately caused the cash 
market price for fed cattle to be lower than it otherwise 
would have been; and (5) Tyson’s use of captive supply 
injured each member of the class. The jury then found that 
Tyson’s use of captive supplies from February 1, 1994 
through October 31, 2002 damaged the cash market for fed 
cattle in the amount of $1,281,690,000. 
Tyson’s Post-Trial Motion and the Proper Legal 
Analysis 
On February 25, Tyson filed a motion for Judgment as a 
Matter of Law or for a New Trial. In the motion, Tyson 
argues that the plaintiffs failed to provide evidence 
sufficient for the jury to find against them on any of the 
points on which the jury was instructed. In the motion, 
Tyson claims that it lacks the market power to influence the 
price paid for fed cattle, and that plaintiffs failed to 
establish the elements for a case under Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act.14 However, under PSA, a plaintiff need not 
prove the existence of market power in the classic antitrust 
sense.15 PSA only requires proof of an adverse effect on 
price, or market manipulation.16 
While courts have used the Sherman Act as a guide for 
deciding PSA cases involving Section 202,17 the courts 
have also recognized that Section 202 of the PSA 
proscribes practices that the Sherman Act would not bar.18 
The PSA’s distinctiveness is that the PSA is focused on 
monopsony power – a relatively high level of concentration 
among purchasers and many unorganized sellers.19  In 
contrast, the Sherman Act focuses on monopoly – 
concentration among sellers into a market. 
The key question in Pickett20 is the appropriate standard 
to be utilized in evaluating whether the provisions of the 
PSA have been violated. The statutory language and the 
congressional history of the PSA,21 as well as prior 
caselaw,22 indicate strongly that the PSA governs activity 
not prohibited under the Sherman or Clayton Acts.23 Thus, a 
Sherman Act rule of reason analysis seems inappropriate in 
determining proscribed conduct in a PSA context. Instead, 
under the PSA, the test for improper behavior is necessarily 
multi-dimensional. Key to a determination of the presence 
of improper behavior is (1) the degree of concentration 
among buyers; (2) the extent of regional dominance by one 
packer (or few if collusion is present); (3) the utilization of 
practices or devices that, in such a setting, could be anti-
competitive in effect; and (4) the extent to which legitimate 
business practices are served that could not be served by 
alternative approaches to procurement of the raw material 
involved that do not have the effect of manipulating prices. 
Implications for the Future 
Pickett24 is, perhaps, the most important case ever 
decided under the PSA. The case has potentially far-
reaching implications for the livestock industry. If the case 
survives Tyson’s post-trial motion and is upheld on appeal, 
the second phase of the case will involve injunctive relief. 
The injunctive phase of the case will involve a 
determination of the permanent structural changes in the 
marketing of fed cattle necessary to bring the industry into 
compliance with the PSA. 
FOOTNOTES 
1 Pickett, et al. v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., No. 96-A-
1103-N (M.D. Ala., certified as class action on Dec. 26, 
2001). 
2 7 U.S.C. § 181 et seq. 
3 See note 1 supra. 
4 7 U.S.C. § 192. 
5 Id. 
6 The PSA was described by its sponsors as “the most far-
reaching measure and extend[ed] further than any 
previous law into the regulation of private business – 
with few exceptions.” 61 Cong. Rec. 1801, 4783 
(1921); H.R. Rep. No. 77, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 
(1921). 
7 The problems addressed by the PSA are peculiar to the 
livestock industry. Those problems dated back to the 
late 1880s. For example, on May 16, 1888, the U.S. 
Senate authorized an investigation of the buying and 
selling of livestock to determine if the major packers 
were manipulating prices. The investigation was 
conducted over a two-year period and indicated that the 
major packers were engaging in unfair, discriminatory 
and anticompetitive practices by means of price fixing, 
agreements not to compete, refusals to sell and the like. 
See Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 499 (1922). 
8 7 U.S.C. § 209(b). 
9 Section 6 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 
U.S.C. § 46) is incorporated into the PSA by § 402 of 
the PSA. 7 U.S.C. § 222. 
10 7 U.S.C. § 209(b). 
11 7 U.S.C. § 192. 
12 See note 1 supra. 
13 See 7 U.S.C. § 192. 
14 15 U.S.C. § 2. Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, the 
offense of monopoly requires possession of monopoly 
power in the relevant market and willful acquisition or 
maintenance of that power. Tyson, in its motion, bases 
much of its argument on the notion that the plaintiffs 
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have failed to establish that the national market for fed 
cattle is national, that regional price differentials occur 
and, as such, Tyson does not have sufficient market 
power to influence the price paid for fed cattle. 
15 Arguably, under the PSA (unlike the Sherman Act), it is 
irrelevant whether the market for fed cattle is national. 
The key is whether a regionally dominant packer utilizes 
buying practices that have the effect of manipulating 
prices. 
16 7 U.S.C. § 192. 
17 See, e.g., Armour & Co. v. United States, 402 F.2d 712, 
722 (7th Cir. 1968). 
18 See, e.g., De Jong Packing Co. v. United States 
Department of Agriculture, 618 F.2d 1329, 1335 (9th 
Cir. 1980); Swift & Co. v. United States, 393 F.2d 247, 
253 (7th Cir. 1968); Swift & Co. v. United States, 308 
F.2d 849, 853 (7th Cir. 1962). 
19 An important feature of monopsony is regional 
dominance that is heavily influenced by shipping costs 
to access other competitive markets (i.e., packers). 
20 See note 1 supra. 
21 See notes 6-7 supra. 
22 See notes 17-18 supra. 
23 The Sherman Act is codified as 15 U.S.C. §1 et seq. 
The Clayton Act is codified as 15 U.S.C. §12 et seq. 
24 See note 1 supra. 
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES

by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr. 
ANIMALS

COUNTY FAIR. The plaintiff worked at a concession 
stand at a county fair run by the defendant. As the plaintiff 
walked from the concession stand towards a fair exit, the 
plaintiff passed the barns used for housing, but not showing, 
livestock. A horse drawing a buggy was being returned to the 
barns when it became spooked by a loud popping sound and 
ran into the plaintiff. The plaintiff filed a claim for negligence 
against the defendant which argued that Iowa Code § 673.2 
barred the suit. The trial court granted summary judgment to 
the defendant, ruling that the statute immunized county fair 
sponsors from injuries to spectators. The plaintiff argued that 
the statute did not apply because the plaintiff was not a 
spectator at the fair and was not aware of the risks of the 
domesticated animal activities at the fair. The court held that 
the plaintiff was a spectator because the plaintiff was not a 
horse activity participant but was in the vicinity of the horse 
activities. However, the court held that there was an issue of 
fact whether it was reasonable to expect that the plaintiff 
would be aware of the risks of runaway horses just from 
walking in a pedestrian walkway at a county fair. If a fact 
finder found that a reasonable person would not be aware of 
such a risk, the statute would not apply to immunize the 
defendant from suit. Hynes v. Clay County Fair Ass’n, 672 
N.W.2d 764 (Iowa 2003). 
BANKRUPTCY

FEDERAL TAX 
DISCHARGE . The debtors, husband and wife filed their 
1998 federal income tax return on March 17, 1999. On April 
8, 2002, the debtors filed for Chapter 7 and sought to have 
the 1998 tax debt declared dischargeable because they filed 
their return more than three years before they filed their 
bankruptcy petition. The court held that Section 
507(a)(8)(A)(i) refers to a date more than three years after a 
return was last due. Because the 1998 tax return was last due 
on April 15, 1999, the Chapter 7 petition was filed within 
three years of the date when the 1998 return was last due and 
the taxes were not dischargeable. In re Reine, 301 B.R. 556 
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2003). 
TAX LIEN . The debtor had owned a car dealership with 
the debtor’s father. When the father died, the father’s shares 
in the dealership passed to the debtor. The father’s estate had 
unpaid federal estate taxes and elected to pay these taxes in 
installments. The estate executed a lien on the father’s shares 
as part of the agreement to allow installment payments of the 
taxes. Four years later, the son sold all of the assets to an 
unrelated company in exchange for the hiring of the debtor as 
a consultant. the IRS argued that the lien should cover the 
proceeds of the sale of the dealership assets. The court held 
that the estate tax lien was created by statute and could not be 
extended under any theory of equity; therefore, the lien was 
restricted to the shares of stock in the dealership and could 
not be used to cover the proceeds of the sale of the 
company’s assets. In re Roth, 301 B.R. 451 (Bankr. W.D. 
Penn. 2003). 
CONTRACTS

ARBITRATION CLAUSE . The plaintiff meat processor 
had recruited the defendants, hog farmers, to raise hogs under 
contracts exclusively for the plaintiff. The plaintiff provided 
the hogs, feed and medication and the farmers housed and fed 
the hogs. Title to the hogs remained with the plaintiff at all 
times. When the price of pork declined, the plaintiff cancelled 
many of the contracts and the defendants sued for fraud, 
deceit and promissory estoppel. The plaintiff filed a motion 
to stay the litigation and to compel arbitration under 
arbitration clauses in all of the contracts. The defendants 
